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I. Introduction
Risk is a major issue in developing countries. Many researchers have stressed
the severity of risk in developing countries (e.g., Baulch and Hoddinott 2000;
Fafchamps 2003; Dercon 2005a). Kinsey, Burger, and Gunning (1998) find
that harvest failures were very frequent in the resettlement areas in rural
Zimbabwe. Lybbert et al. (2004) claim that, among the pastoralists in the
arid and semiarid lands of eastern and southern Africa, livestock losses during
one cycle of drought and recovery can be up to 50%–80% for cattle and 30%
for sheep and goats. In the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS), farmers
were asked to list the shocks they experienced in 1999–2004: 52% of the
households reported drought, 38% reported pests or diseases affecting crops
or livestock, and 35% reported the death of a household member (Dercon,
Hoddinott, and Woldehanna 2005).
Households employ several methods to cope with these types of risk. Strat-
egies include accumulating and decumulating assets (Deaton 1991), diversi-
fying agricultural income by planting multiple crops (Dercon 1996), shifting
labor to off-farm employment (Kochar 1999), and taking loans (Udry 1990,
1994;1 Fafchamps and Lund 2003) or transfers (Dercon and Krishnan 2003).
There are many empirical studies on the issue of risk pooling. Most of them
consider two questions. The first is whether risk is fully insured. The most
famous example is Townsend (1994), which tests for full insurance by re-
gressing individual consumption on individual income and aggregated village
consumption or income. This idea that under full insurance idiosyncratic
shocks should not have a significant impact on consumption has been adopted
by many researchers (e.g., Grimard [1997]; Ravallion and Chaudhuri [1997];
I wish to thank the editor, the associate editor, and two anonymous referees of this journal, Jan
Willem Gunning, and Chris Elbers for their very useful comments; Stefan Dercon for providing
the aggregated data of income, consumption, and livestock; and John Cockburn for letting me use
his programs for estimating the income function. All errors are my own.
1 The contingent repayment with the loans makes the loans very similar to transfers in the Udry
studies.
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Jalan and Ravallion [1999]; and De Weerdt and Dercon [2006] all applied
this idea in their papers).
The second question is how responsive the risk pooling strategies are to
shocks. This is usually determined by regressing a variable that indicates a
measure of risk coping strategy on shocks. For example, Jalan and Ravallion
(2001) study the relation between unproductive liquid assets and risk. Faf-
champs and Lund (2003) explore how gifts, informal loans, and sales of live-
stock and grain respond to shocks. Kochar (1999) investigates how households
increase their labor supply to cope with risk.
Despite the rich literature in risk pooling, most of the papers can only
provide an answer to whether there is full insurance but not how large the
impact of different risk pooling strategies is on risk pooling. It is tempting
to use the coefficient from the Townsend test to measure how far away the
observed risk sharing is from full insurance. However, such an interpretation
should be done with caution as households can rely on self-insurance instead
of social insurance to stabilize their consumption. To take an extreme example,
in a community where self-insurance through consumption smoothing is the
only method for risk management, the Townsend test would suggest a high
extent of risk pooling, when in fact there is none. This suggests that the
Townsend coefficient cannot be used as a measure of the extent of risk sharing.
In the studies of specific strategies, usually only the significance of coeffi-
cients is meaningful. The value itself does not tell how much risk is insured
by a certain strategy, since the variables of shocks are usually dummies or
indices (examples using the ERHS data set are Dercon [2004] and Dercon et
al. [2005]).
It is usually not sufficient to know if a certain strategy plays a role in risk
pooling. Estimating to what extent shocks are pooled is essential for researchers
to evaluate the importance of different strategies. For example, one worry
about introducing formal insurance to farmers in developing countries is that
it will crowd out informal insurance, which might make the resulting gain
in welfare relatively small. If informal insurance does play a role in insuring
risk, whether or not to implement formal insurance depends on how large
the impact of informal insurance is on risk pooling. Therefore, going from a
qualitative measure of the degree of risk sharing to a quantitative measure is
a crucial step in understanding the risk pooling behavior of households.
In this article I focus on risk pooling through transfers using ERHS data.
In order to help poor households in bad times, government and nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) provide food aid and food-for-work programs. A large
amount of food aid is distributed every year in Ethiopia. The annual volume
of cereal food aid has ranged between 3.5% and 26% of the total domestic
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food grain production over the 1985–96 period (Clay, Molla, and Habtewold
1999). However, the targeting of food aid is poor: Dercon and Krishnan (2003)
report that the characteristics of those who obtained aid and those who did
not differ very little.
Aside from external aid from government and NGOs, mutual support is
also very common in rural Ethiopia. Hoddinott, Dercon, and Krishnan (2005)
study the networks in ERHS villages and find that many households have
connections to different sorts of social networks and get support from them.
In good years, households send transfers to households suffering negative
shocks; in bad years, they receive support from other households. From this
point of view, transfers work like insurance that collects premiums from those
households that experience positive shocks and compensates those households
that experience negative shocks.
The social networks in which such risk pooling occurs can be informal,
based on kinship, friendship, or religion. These social networks may not be
designed to pool risk (Fafchamps and Gubert [2005] provide an example for
rural Philippines). There are also semiformal organizations in rural Ethiopia.
These organizations require membership and fees. For example, the funeral
association iddir is prevalent in Ethiopia. The institution collects contributions
from its members and pays out to a household when a member or relative of
a member dies (Hoddinott et al. 2005).
I explore two functions of transfers. It is well known that shocks can have
persistent effects on growth (e.g., Dercon [2004] provides evidence of this for
Ethiopia). Transfers may play a role in insuring shocks. The degree of risk
pooling through transfers depends on the type of shocks. If the shocks are
idiosyncratic, households may be able to rely on their social networks to insure
the shocks. If the shocks are covariant, households will not be able to do so
since the social networks are usually geographically concentrated. This is likely
to be the case in the surveyed villages, where Hoddinott et al. (2005) find
that 87% of the individuals in the households’ social networks are in the same
village. Therefore, it is unlikely that households are able to rely on their social
networks to insure covariant income shocks, and government actions are nec-
essary for households to avoid the welfare loss from covariant income shocks.
Therefore, measures of both idiosyncratic and covariant shocks are constructed.
By decomposing the shocks in this way, I study the roles that transfers from
government or NGOs and friends or relatives play in insuring these two types
of shocks separately.
However, households with negative shocks are not necessarily poor house-
holds. Transfers may try to target not only the unlucky households but also
the poor households. Transfers are then used to reallocate income from richer
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households to poorer households. In this case, transfers depend not on shocks
but on income differentials.
In summary, while many researchers have studied the effectiveness of various
risk pooling strategies, most can answer only whether risk is fully insured. In
this article I use continuous rather than discrete measures of shocks, which
are constructed from a regression of income on income determinants. How
much risk pooling households achieve through transfers can be studied based
on the shocks I construct.
This article is organized as follows. Section II describes the data set. Section
III gives the econometric specification. Section IV discusses the results. Section
V concludes.
II. Data
The data used are from the ERHS. The survey data were collected by the
Economics Department of Addis Ababa University in collaboration with the
Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University and the
International Food Policy Research Institute. The EHRS is one of the few
panel data sets available at the household level in Africa. In 1989, around
450 households in six sites were initially surveyed for a famine study. Three
more sites were added in 1994–95 to include areas north of Debre Birhan,
which could not be surveyed in 1989 due to military conflict. Six other sites
were also added to cover the main agroclimatic zones and farming systems of
the richer parts of the country.2
In total 1,477 households were surveyed in the beginning of 1994. In
constructing the panel, the sample was stratified to ensure a sufficient coverage
of the main farming systems and of female and landless households. These
households have been reinterviewed several times subsequently. New survey
rounds took place in the second half of 1994 and in 1995, 1997, 1999, and
2004. The data from the first five of the seven rounds are publicly available.
Since the 1989 survey used a very different questionnaire from that of the
later rounds and also covered different villages, I use the data from only the
1994 (two rounds), 1995, and 1997 surveys for the purposes of this article.
The data set provides detailed information on household income and assets
as well as transfers. Means and standard deviations of household income and
assets can be found in table 1. The income data are collected by asking about
four sources of household income: farm income, labor income, livestock income,
and transfer income.
2 This section mainly draws on Dercon and Krishnan (1998).
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TABLE 1
DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES
Variables Definition Mean SD
Yearly income (y) Household income excluding transfers (in Br) 2,933.32 13,585.41
Male (m) Male household members (age≥ 16) 1.48 1.06
Female (f) Female household members (age≥ 16) 1.54 .94
Child (ch) Household members ages 6–15 1.81 1.53
Livestock (k) Value of the livestock owned by the household
(in Br), divided by 1,000 2.06 3.16
Land (lan) Land owned by the household (in hectares) 2.49 38.81
Other assets Value of other productive assets (hoes, plows,
etc.) owned by household (in Br) 52.65 148.73
Landless Dummy: p 1 if the household has no land; 0 if
not .09 .29
Land quality Share of land that is lem (good land) .42 .43
Plant coffee Dummy: p 1 if the household has (a) coffee
plant(s); 0 if not .27 .44
Plant qat Dummy: p 1 if the household has (a) qat
plant(s); 0 if not .13 .34
Plant false banana Dummy: p 1 if the household has (a) false ba-
nana plant(s); 0 if not .29 .45
Plant eucalyptus Dummy: p 1 if the household has (a) eucalyptus
plant(s); 0 if not .34 .47
Female head Dummy: p 1 if the household head is female; 0
if not .21 .41
Head age Age of the household head 46.40 16.42
Head education Years of education of the household head 1.52 2.74
Haresaw Dummy: p 1 if the household in Haresaw site; 0
if not .05 .22
Geblen Dummy: p 1 if the household in Geblen site; 0 if
not .04 .20
Dinki Dummy: p 1 if the household in Dinki site; 0 if
not .06 .23
Debre Dummy: p 1 if the household in Debre Berhan
site; 0 if not .13 .33
Yetmen Dummy: p 1 if the household in Yetmen site; 0
if not .04 .20
Shumsha Dummy: p 1 if the household in Shumsha site; 0
if not .09 .29
Sirbana Dummy: p 1 if the household in Sirbana Godeti
site; 0 if not .07 .25
Adele Dummy: p 1 if the household in Adele Keke
site; 0 if not .07 .25
Korod Dummy: p 1 if the household in Koro-degaga
site; 0 if not .08 .27
Turfe Dummy: p 1 if the household in Turfe Keche-
mane site; 0 if not .07 .26
Imdibir Dummy: p 1 if the household in Imdibir site; 0 if
not .05 .21
Azedeboa Dummy: p 1 if the household in Aze Deboa site;
0 if not .05 .22
Addado Dummy: p 1 if the household in Addado site; 0
if not .09 .29
Garagodo Dummy: p 1 if the household in Gara Godo site;
0 if not .07 .25
Doma Dummy: p 1 if the household in Doma site; 0 if
not .05 .21
Observations 4,164
Source. Author’s calculation using the ERHS data.
Note. 1 Ethiopian birr [Br] ≈ US$0.1. Observations with missing values are not included.
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Land is allocated by peasant associations.3 Selling land is illegal, though
renting and sharecropping exist.4 Livestock is the most important productive
asset for the households in the surveyed villages. Other productive assets such
as hoes and plows amount to only 7% of the value of livestock.5
As the survey was designed in 1989 for studying the drought in 1984–85,
questions about shocks were asked in each round of the survey. For example,
information about rainfall and shocks on crops is included in the data set.
The data also contain information about changes in household composition
and birth and death information for livestock. However, since the questions are
mainly in the form of yes and no, the data do not contain much quantitative
information of risk. Thus in this article I measure risk based on observed income.
The ERHS data provide information about households’ transfer income from
which the amount of transfers each household receives can be identified. The
income data include not only food aid but also other income from transfers.
The data indicate whether the transfer is from friends and relatives6 or from
government and NGOs and how much each household earns from food-for-
work programs.
The transfers that households hand out are part of their expenditures. Taxes
and contributions to peasant associations are treated as the transfers to gov-
ernment/NGOs. Transfers to friends and relatives include several types of
transfers: food the household gives out, educational and medical expenses the
household pays for members of other households, contributions to church and
iddir, and contributions for livestock loss.
The first round (in 1994), third round (in 1995), and fourth round (in
1997) of the surveys were conducted in similar seasons. In the first round and
fourth round surveys, information on transfers, including all those handed out
and received in the four months before the surveys, was collected. For com-
parison purposes, the data of the third round survey are adjusted if the time
between the second round survey and the third round survey is not 4 months.
The descriptive statistics for transfers are given in table 2. There are three
3 In Ethiopia, a peasant association is not a farmers’ self-help group as the name might suggest,
but the lowest tier of civil administration. The peasant association can be considered as a local
government institution covering one or more villages, and so transfers to and from peasant asso-
ciations can be considered as a component of transfers to and from government/NGOs.
4 During the initial land reform in 1975 and the subsequent redistributions, peasant associations
were instructed to use household size as the criterion to allocate land. There were also other factors
that determine land allocation. Examples include land quality, if the household was newly formed,
if the household had cultivated a certain parcel of land, etc.
5 Calculated using the ERHS data.
6 Transfers from organizations like the iddir funeral association are also included in this category,
since these transfers are from households’ social networks and are part of the mutual support.
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE TRANSFERS
Variables Observations* Mean Median SD 99th Percentile Max
Total transfers in 1,062 136 57 500 1,300 14,319
Transfers in from gov-
ernment/NGOs 445 112 47 687 492 14,319
Food for work 242 120 76 128 603 955
Transfers in from
friends/relatives 438 150 48 343 1,969 3,518
Total transfers out† 3,474 39 22 68 272 1,499
Transfers out to gov-
ernment/NGOs 2,075 28 19 59 187 1,396
Transfers out to
friends/relatives 3,136 24 11 47 187 1,081
Food handed out 224 584 331 707 3,494 4,387
Note. All the statistics are based on the value of transfers for 4 months (the unit is birr).
* The number of the nonzero observations.
† Food handed out is excluded.
characteristics of the transfers that should be noted. First, we can see from the
big differences between the 99th percentiles and the maxima that there are a
few observations with very high levels of transfers. These observations are very
likely to reflect measurement errors. For example, the units of the in-kind
transfers may have been recorded incorrectly in the survey.
Second, the amount of “food handed out” is large compared with other
transfers. Since only the amount of food handed out 1 week before each survey
was asked, the data have to be multiplied by a large number (17.3) to make
it a 4-month total. Thus I consider these data to be noisy and exclude them
from the later analyses.
Third, transfer levels are generally low. Because of the outliers, the medians
are probably better measures of the level than the means. Compared with the
income level in table 1, transfers amount to less than 15% of income (obtained
by multiplying transfers by three to adjust the 4-month total to a yearly total).
The extent to which transfers insure against income risk depends not only
on average transfer levels but also on their distributions. In table 3, I list the
median income, the value of transfers handed out and received, and the per-
centage of households that hand out or receive transfers in each village in each
year. It is clear from the table that a high percentage of households hand out
transfers, but transfers received are location dependent for both those from
government and NGOs and from friends and relatives. Comparing the median
income to the percentages of households that receive and hand out transfers
in villages, I find some cases that may reflect income redistribution. For ex-
ample, in the rich village Sirbana Godeti almost all the households transfer
out, while in the relatively poor village Shumsha a high percentage of the
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TABLE 3
VALUE OF TRANSFERS AND PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT RECEIVED AND HANDED OUT
TRANSFERS
Village Year
Median
Income
Government/NGOs Friends/Relatives
Transfers
In
Food for
Work
Transfers
Out
Transfers
In
Transfers
Out
Haresaw 94 1,096 0
(0)
6,121
(62)
59
(24)
189
(4)
162
(38)
95 460 262
(5)
2,455
(23)
443
(25)
379
(1)
116
(25)
97 1,169 94
(3)
2,590
(15)
763
(57)
747
(12)
605
(72)
Geblen 94 529 141
(2)
5,790
(78)
17
(2)
0
(0)
70
(13)
95 334 80
(2)
42
(2)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
97 135 2,716
(63)
255
(5)
328
(34)
129
(2)
80
(27)
Dinki 94 577 0
(0)
0
(0)
829
(49)
258
(1)
276
(32)
95 155 0
(0)
0
(0)
395
(32)
49
(3)
139
(20)
97 967 0
(0)
0
(0)
82
(5)
555
(4)
247
(47)
Debre Berhan 94 3,054 258
(1)
0
(0)
2,392
(69)
1,067
(7)
1,527
(78)
95 1,597 361
(2)
0
(0)
1,775
(88)
5
(1)
1,263
(88)
97 2,878 0
(0)
0
(0)
838
(19)
755
(6)
2,495
(94)
Yetmen 94 1,588 0
(0)
0
(0)
1,181
(89)
0
(0)
1,171
(60)
95 2,159 0
(0)
0
(0)
539
(89)
55
(5)
254
(74)
97 3,460 0
(0)
13
(2)
274
(22)
205
(5)
659
(65)
Shumsha 94 689 30,626
(96)
0
(0)
2,433
(81)
795
(3)
3,512
(87)
95 784 4,175
(60)
955
(1)
999
(72)
414
(8)
1,286
(86)
97 1,049 2,820
(55)
0
(0)
185
(8)
296
(3)
4,169
(90)
Sirbana Godeti 94 3,716 115
(1)
0
(0)
2,145
(87)
56
(1)
3,284
(96)
95 3,357 0
(0)
0
(0)
1,169
(81)
437
(4)
2,242
(96)
97 3,646 202
(1)
0
(0)
5,062
(73)
461
(3)
7,083
(100)
Adele Keke 94 1,689 0
(0)
3,151
(21)
4,347
(71)
1,699
(8)
1,722
(34)
95 2,262 0
(0)
380
(1)
300
(19)
1,023
(18)
322
(35)
97 2,766 3,146
(59)
168
(1)
12,158
(78)
695
(6)
2,240
(70)
Koro-degaga 94 1,053 69
(1)
0
(0)
2,213
(94)
3,979
(28)
1,408
(89)
95 1,970 516
(17)
0
(0)
1,344
(82)
6,427
(28)
1,583
(92)
97 2,626 506
(3)
0
(0)
2,323
(40)
9,540
(20)
1,789
(89)
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TABLE 3 (Continued )
Village Year
Median
Income
Government/NGOs Friends/Relatives
Transfers
In
Food for
Work
Transfers
Out
Transfers
In
Transfers
Out
Turfe Kechemane 94 2,508 587
(3)
0
(0)
138
(16)
7,842
(19)
1,837
(93)
95 3,787 1,413
(1)
642
(12)
1,224
(90)
3,931
(19)
2,476
(91)
97 3,862 0
(0)
0
(0)
8
(1)
2,964
(10)
2,891
(96)
Imdibir 94 4,354 75
(1)
613
(6)
59
(3)
2,990
(10)
3,742
(99)
95 1,431 86
(13)
2,708
(51)
592
(52)
2,616
(31)
1,004
(97)
97 1,524 160
(18)
0
(0)
901
(47)
3,962
(40)
2,175
(98)
Aze Deboa 94 1,287 0
(0)
0
(0)
183
(5)
1,081
(14)
6,481
(90)
95 1,751 68
(3)
0
(0)
2,218
(69)
363
(13)
1,527
(100)
97 2,155 414
(1)
0
(0)
139
(4)
3,065
(19)
1,177
(97)
Addado 94 1,308 22
(1)
0
(0)
1,832
(63)
55
(1)
2,961
(76)
95 2,003 0
(0)
0
(0)
1,720
(55)
2,459
(2)
1,390
(71)
97 3,082 0
(0)
0
(0)
1,211
(38)
130
(5)
3,188
(95)
Gara Godo 94 592 0
(0)
49
(1)
1,314
(71)
1,068
(13)
2,920
(93)
95 934 0
(0)
266
(12)
922
(74)
47
(4)
620
(84)
97 1,199 623
(7)
82
(1)
22
(3)
2,761
(96)
653
(97)
Doraa 94 859 34
(1)
0
(0)
958
(74)
75
(1)
353
(56)
95 456 83
(4)
2,856
(73)
322
(34)
16
(3)
154
(34)
97 1,036 70
(2)
0
(0)
226
(16)
0
(0)
538
(50)
Source. Author’s calculation using the ERHS data.
Note. The value of transfers is given in Ethiopian birrs, with the percentage of households that
receive and hand out transfers included in parentheses. Food handed out is excluded from transfers
out to friends/relatives.
households receive transfers from government/NGOs.7 Risk pooling is less
clear from table 3. Some cases that may reflect insurance can be found. For
example, the income in Geblen in 1997 is much lower because of a drought
7 To provide more formal evidence of this, I regress the value and the percentage of transfers on
the median income. The results are reported in table Bl in app. B. I find that the richer villages
receive less from government/NGOs and that the richer villages pay out more to both government/
NGOs and friends/relatives. These findings are all in line with income redistribution. The only
exception is transfers in from friends/relatives, for which richer villages receive more. I am indebted
to one of the referees for suggesting these regressions.
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than that in the other two years, so 63% of the households in the village get
transfers from government/NGOs. However, for villages like Adele Keke and
Gara Godo, table 3 seems to show that there is no risk pooling, as they get
transfers in the years with higher median income. Of course, comparing the
village median income in one year to that of the other years is not a precise
way of measuring risk. In addition it excludes all idiosyncratic shocks. Section
III will provide a sophisticated way to measure shocks and further explore the
issue of risk pooling and income distribution in the 15 Ethiopian villages.
III. The Effects of Transfers, Risk Pooling, and Redistribution
A. The Income Equation and Measures of Shocks
In this section, I construct two kinds of shocks: covariant income shocks and
idiosyncratic income shocks. Several methods have been used in the literature
to measure income shocks. Rosenzweig (1988) uses the difference between a
household’s income and its mean income over a 9-year panel. Jacoby and
Skoufias (1997) define the idiosyncratic shock as the deviation of the change
in log full income from the change in the village-season-year mean and the
aggregate shock as the mean change itself. Kochar (1999) measures income
shocks as the residual in a regression of crop profits on a household fixed effect,
lagged income, and the amount of land owned. Similar to Kochar (1999), I
define my income shocks as the difference between household income (ex-yt
cluding transfers) at period t and the household’s expected income Et1yt (ex-
cluding transfers) at period as determined from a regression of on at 1 yt
set of income determinants. I assume that income depends on three compo-
nents: capital, labor, and land. In the ERHS context, capital takes the form
of livestock. Demographic variables and other household characteristics are
used as additional predictors. As mentioned in Section II, the data contain
some information about income related shocks so they are also included in
the regressors. Using a constant elasticity of substitution as the functional
form of the income function,8 household income is modeled as
r r r t/ry p (a k  a lab  a lan )vht 1 vht1 2 vht1 3 vht1
# exp h a  f c  w l  l w (1)(   i i,vht1 j j,vh t t p p,vht
i j t p
 x o  cons e , )q q,vht vht
q
lab p m  b f  b ch , (2)vht1 vht1 1 vht1 2 vht1
8 This functional form and the choice of most of the variables are based on Cockburn (2002).
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where v, h, and t are indexes of village, household, and time, respectively, and
, , , , , , and are coefficients. The parameter t is the scale returna b h f w l xi i i j t p q
of production, and r is the substitution parameter. The variable y is household
income excluding transfers, k is livestock, lab is the aggregate household labor
as defined in equation (2), and lan is land. The variables m, f, and ch represent
males, females, and children, respectively, present in the household.9 The var-
iables and denote time-variant and time-invariant predictors, respectively.10a ci j
The definitions of these variables are listed in table 1. Village dummies are
included in the variable to capture the village fixed effect. The variablec lj t
denotes the year dummies. The variable denotes observed weather-relatedwp
shocks, and denotes the other observed shocks. Table 4 lists the definitionsoq
of and . Weather-related shocks are the shocks caused by rain, temperature,w op q
storm, and flood. Other shocks are shocks on crops caused by diseases, livestock,
and birds, as well as shocks on livestock and the composition of households.
The variable cons is a constant and e is the error term.
It should be noted that in the income function defined in (1) and (2), the
error term is correlated across households. Since village dummies and yearevht
dummies are included in and , can be written asc l ej t vht
e p g  b  n , (3)vht vt vh vht
where , , and denote the unobserved village specific shocks, the house-g b nvt vh vht
hold effect,11 and the unobserved idiosyncratic shocks, respectively, and g ∼vt
, , .2 2 2N(0,j ) b ∼ N(0,j ) n ∼ N(0,j )g vh b vht n
I also allow for serial correlation in the shocks:
g 2 2 n 2 2Cov (e , e )p c j  j  c j p j , (4)vh,94 vh,95 1 g b 1 n 1
g 2 2 n 2 2Cov (e , e )p c j  j  c j p j , (5)vh,95 vh,97 2 g b 2 n 2
g 2 2 n 2 2Cov (e , e )p c j  j  c j p j , (6)vh,94 vh,97 3 g b 3 n 3
where , , and are the correlations of the village-specific shocks and ,g g g nc c c c1 2 3 1
, and are the correlations of the unobserved idiosyncratic shocks.n nc c2 3
9 This measure of labor is not responsive to shocks. With the setting of this article, if labor is
indeed responsive to shocks, it will be counted as a shock itself.
10 Since stratification was used in choosing households to survey, I include indicator variables for
landless and female households in in order to pool all the data. The information for weighingai
the sample is limited, as stated in the data description by Dercon and Hoddinott (2004), so no
sampling weights are used in the regressions.
11 Since the panel is short and the income equation is highly nonlinear, estimating the income
equation with a household fixed effect does not give sensible estimates of the coefficients.
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TABLE 4
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES OF OBSERVED SHOCKS
Variables Definition
w1 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that the rain came on time in the
previous farming season; 0 if not
w2 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that there was enough rain in the
previous farming season; 0 if not
w3 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that the rain stopped on time in the
previous farming season; 0 if not
w4 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that there was enough rain in the
harvest in the previous farming season; 0 if not
w5 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that crops suffered from low temper-
ature in the previous farming season; 0 if not
w6 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that crops suffered from wind/storm
in the previous farming season; 0 if not
w7 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that crops suffered from flooding/wa-
ter logging in the previous farming season; 0 if not
o1 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that crops suffered from diseases in
the previous farming season; 0 if not
o2 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that crops suffered from livestock
eating/trampling in the previous farming season; 0 if not
o3 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that crops suffered from birds/other
animals in the previous farming season; 0 if not
o4 Dummy: p 1 if the household reported that crops suffered from weed dam-
age in the previous farming season; 0 if not
o5 The size of land that was allocated to the three crops that were reported by
households to be most affected by weather, insects, diseases, etc.,
weighted by the severity of the affection
o6 Livestock shock: , where bvht is the birth of livestock in value(b d )/kvht vht vh,t1
and dvht is the death of livestock in value
o7 , where dhvht is the number of household members who dieddh /hhsizevht vh,t1
and hhsizevh,t1 is the size of household in the beginning of the year
o8 , where joinvht is the number of household members whojoin /hhsizevht vh,t1
joined the household and hhsizevh,t1 is the size of household in the begin-
ning of the year
Income is often found to be measured with errors in household surveys.
These errors can be caused by a tendency of the surveyed households to un-
derreport their income, recall bias, and so on. In addition, as the income data
in the ERHS were collected by asking about household income from all possible
sources, such as from farm income and wage income, an incomplete list of
income sources in the questionnaire can also cause errors in measuring income.
As these causes apply to every round of the survey and are likely to affect
income in each round in the same way, it may well be reasonable to assume
that the errors in measuring income are constant over time.
Under the assumptions that the errors in measuring income are constant
and that they are not correlated to the explanatory variables in the income
equation (eq. [1]) and the components of the error term ( and ), theg nvt vht
errors in measuring income are a component of . Since I have included asbvh
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many variables that capture the household fixed effect as possible in the ex-
planatory variables of the income equation (age, education of the household
head, etc.), a big part of should be the errors in measuring income. Esti-bvh
mating should allow me to deal with the errors in measuring income tobvh
some extent.
Accordingly I can now write the expected income asE (y exp (b ))t1 vht vh
r r r t/rE (y exp (b ))p (a k  a lab  a lan )t1 vht vh 1 vht1 2 vht1 3 vht1
# exp h a  f c  cons(  )i i,vht1 j j,vh
i j
#E exp l w  x o (7)( t1 p p,vht q q,vht
p q
 w l  g  n . )t t vt vht
t
Assuming , I can rewrite equa-2 l w  x o  w l ∼ N(0,j )p p,vht q q,vht t t op q t
tion (7) as
r rE (y exp (b ))p (a k  a labt1 vht vh 1 vht1 2 vht1
r t/ra lan )3 vht1
# exp h a  f c (8)( i i,vht1 j j,vh
i j
2 2 2j  j  jo g n
 cons ,)
2
and the shock can be defined as
ys p y exp (b ) E (y exp (b ))vht vht vh t1 vht vh
p E (y exp (b )) exp l w  x o (9)( ( t1 vht vh p p,vht q q,vht
p q
2 2 2j  j  jo g n
 w l  g  n   1 ) )t t vt vht 2t
yp E (y exp (b ))(exp (d ) 1),t1 vht vh vht
where .y 2 2 2d p  l w  x o  w l  g  n  (j  j  j )/2vht p p,vht q q,vht t t vt vht o g np q t
I use feasible generalized least squares to estimate this model. The details
of the estimation procedure can be found in appendix A. Table 5 shows the
estimation results of the income function.
From estimating the income function, I obtain the residual from the re-
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE INCOME FUNCTION
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable: Income
Coefficient t-Statistic
Scale returns ( )t .642*** 16.31
Substitution ( )r .485*** 6.71
Livestock ( )a1 .269*** 7.42
Labor ( )a2 .448*** 9.87
Land ( )a3 .283*** 6.86
Female ( )b1 .410*** 3.91
Kid ( )b2 .281*** 3.84
Landless .263*** 2.62
Land quality .099** 2.45
Plant coffee .406*** 5.72
Plant qat .338*** 4.68
Plant false banana .050 .66
Plant eucalyptus .091** 2.31
Female head .130*** 2.69
Head age .005*** 4.16
Head education .031*** 4.61
Haresaw .484** 2.10
Geblen 1.267*** 5.39
Dinki 1.002*** 4.35
Yetmen .009 .04
Shumsha .502** 2.23
Sirbana .532** 2.35
Adele .174 .74
Korod .091 .40
Turfe .468** 2.01
Imdibir .099 .38
Azedeboa .385 1.55
Addado .328 1.31
Garagodo .726*** 2.99
Doma .667*** 2.86
Year95 .059 .58
Year97 .316*** 3.09
Constant 6.902*** 36.32
Observed shocks Not reported
Observations 4,164
2R .45
Note. The parameter is calculated using .a a p 1a a3 3 1 2
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
gression, which is an estimate of (denoted by ). I regress on the villageˆ ˆe e evht vht vht
dummies to get an estimate of (denoted by ).ˆg gvt vt
To obtain an estimate of , I regress on the household dummies.ˆ ˆb e  gvh vht vt
This allows me to obtain an estimate of (denoted by ). Sinceˆ ˆb  n b  nvh vh vhtvht
the panel is short, it is not reasonable to assume that is equal to zero.nvht
Thus it is necessary to exclude it from in order to obtain an estimateˆ ˆb  nvh vht
of . I achieve this by regressing on the change of the crops house-ˆ ˆb b  nvh vh vht
holds stored from the first round to the fourth round.
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This is based on the understanding that households store crops when there
is a good harvest and consume or sell them when there is a bad harvest.
Therefore, if the average shock is positive (negative) in the period from year
94 to year 97, the crops households stored should increase (decrease) in this
period. This relation can be written as:
l w  x o  w l  g  n  p p,vht q q,vht t t vt vht
p q t
p f(cr  cr ) er , (10)vh97 vh94 vh
where and are the crops the household stored in the first and thecr crvh94 vh97
fourth round, respectively, is the error term, and is a functional form.12er f(7)
Since the variable crop storage can be measured without many difficulties in
household surveys, it is unlikely that it is correlated with the errors in mea-
suring income. Therefore, if I regress
ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆU p b  n¯  l w  x o  w l  g (11)  vht vh vht p p,vht q q,vht t t vt
p q t
on , the fitted value from this regression subtracted byf(cr  cr )vh97 vh94
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆl w  x o  w l  g  p p,vht q q,vht t t vt
p q t
can be used as an estimate of . Subtracting from , an estimateˆˆ ˆ ˆn¯ n¯ b  n¯vht vht vh vht
of can be obtained. The results of this regression are reported in table B2bvh
in appendix B.
With the estimates of the coefficients in the income equation and the
estimates of , , and ,13 the expected value of income and the shockg b nvt vh vht
defined in equations (8) and (9) can be calculated. I then regress on village-ydvht
year dummies to decompose it into the covariant part (denoted by ) andcovdvht
the idiosyncratic part (denoted by ). Then the total income shocks canind yd svht vht
12 The form of used is , where and are coef-f(7) d  d (cr  cr )/(0.5(cr  cr ) 1) d d1 2 vh97 vh94 vh97 vh94 1 2
ficients. Dividing by the mean of and makes the expression unit free, and adding 1cr crvh97 vh94
makes it possible to include the observations with no crop stored in both the first and the fourth
round.
13 The estimate of is the sum of the residual from regressing on the household dummiesˆ ˆn e  gvht vht vt
and the estimate .nˆvht
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be decomposed into two parts: the covariant income shock and the idio-covsvht
syncratic income shock :14idisvht
covdvhtcov ys p s , (12)vht vhtydvht
inddvhtidi ys p s . (13)vht vhtydvht
B. Transfers, Risk Pooling, and Redistribution
To study the relation among transfers, risk, and income, I specify the following
equation to model the functions of risk pooling and redistribution of transfers:
cov iditr p g s  g s  v(E y  E y )vht 1 vht 2 vht t1 vht t1 vt
 k x  y z  cons r , (14) i i,vht1 i i,vh vht
i i
where is the net transfer the household gets. The control variables are denotedtr
by and , in which village dummies are also included. The constant termx zi i
is denoted by cons. The variable is the error term. The parameters , ,r g vi
, are coefficients.k yi i
To study the function of insurance, I put on the right-hand side the measures
of covariant and idiosyncratic shocks,15 and , which measure the valuescov idis svht vht
of gains (losses) from shocks. The parameters and measure the contributiong g1 2
of transfers to risk pooling directly.
To capture the role that transfers may play in transferring from richer
households to poorer households, I put on the right-hand side the difference
between the expected income of the household and the median of the expected
income in the village. If transfers do play a pro-poor role, poorer households
14 Decomposed in this way, the shock measures have the following characteristics: (1) covs vht
; (2) and have the same sign and and have the same sign; (3) when goesidi y cov cov ind ind ys p s s d s d svht vht vht vht vht vht vht
to zero, , , and also go to zero.y cov idid s svht vht vht
15 One may argue that the study can be done by putting the observed shocks directly into equation
(14) and there is no need to construct and . There are two reasons that the method describedcov idis svht vht
in this article is preferred. First, only a subset of the shocks is observed. Second, most of the
observed shocks are only qualitative measures of the shocks. The method used in this article provides
a way to measure the shocks quantitatively and integrate all the shocks into two measures. If I do
a regression of transfers on the observed shocks, because of the omitted variables in the regression
and the collinearity between the variables of the observed shocks, some of the estimates of the
coefficients do not seem to be sensible. Moreover, since the observed shocks are only a subset of
the shocks, it is hard to evaluate the extent of risk pooling by investigating these coefficients.
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TABLE 6
RESULTS ON NET TRANSFERS
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables
Net Total
Transfers
(1)
Net Transfers from
Government/NGOs
(2)
Net Transfers from
Mutual Support
(3)
covs (g )vht 1 .0056***
(3.14)
.0045***
(3.56)
.0011
(.86)
idis (g )vht 2 .0002
(.30)
.0005
(1.06)
.0003
(.66)
E y E y (v)t1 vht t1 vt .0070***
(5.41)
.0030***
(3.90)
.0040***
(4.18)
Landless 1.024
(.29)
1.296
(.55)
2.320
(.94)
Land quality .471
(.17)
1.955
(.97)
2.426
(1.23)
Plant coffee 3.755
(.86)
2.274
(.98)
1.481
(.41)
Plant qat 5.076
(.92)
6.810**
(2.15)
1.734
(.39)
Plant false banana 3.897
(.80)
1.457
(.83)
5.354
(1.23)
Plant eucalyptus 4.890
(1.63)
1.840
(.84)
3.050
(1.60)
Female head 2.666
(.91)
2.584
(1.22)
5.250***
(2.59)
Head age .187***
(2.69)
.104**
(2.36)
.083
(1.54)
Head education .553
(1.28)
.489**
(2.16)
.063
(.18)
Constant 22.544***
(4.94)
11.904***
(4.16)
10.640***
(3.05)
Village dummies Not reported
Observations 4,080 4,080 4,080
2R .16 .20 .08
Note. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
should receive more transfers than the richer households. Choosing expected
income instead of real income here is based on the asset-based view in measuring
poverty, since expected income depends only on the household’s assets and
productivity. The parameter measures the effects of transfers on reallocatingv
income.
IV. Results
A. Results on Net Transfers
Table 6 shows the estimation results of equation (14). The three columns show
the results for net total transfers, net transfers from government/NGOs, and
net transfers from mutual support, respectively. The coefficients andg g1 2
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measure how much covariant shocks and idiosyncratic shocks are insured
through transfers, respectively, and the coefficient measures the income re-v
distribution role. Evidence on the two roles that transfers from government/
NGOs may play (the insurance role and the redistribution role) can be found
in table 6. The coefficient is significant but is insignificant in columng g1 2
2, which means that covariant shocks are insured by transfers from government/
NGOs but that idiosyncratic shocks are not insured.16 There is statistically
significant evidence that transfers from government/NGOs go from households
with high expected income to the ones with low expected income, since isv
significant in column 2.17
Transfers from friends/relatives are found to insure neither covariant nor
idiosyncratic shocks, since both and are insignificant in column 3. Likeg g1 2
the results in column 2, there is evidence that transfers from friends/relatives
play a role in redistribution, since is significant in column 3 in table 6.18v
The findings on risk pooling through mutual support are consistent with
what the literature has suggested. As stated in Dercon (2005b), the effectiveness
of the informal arrangements varies according to the type of shocks. Addi-
tionally, informal risk-sharing networks can only insure idiosyncratic but not
covariant shocks, since the networks are mainly restrained within a certain
boundary (e.g., villages). Table 6 shows that households are indeed not able
to insure covariant shocks through transfers, as in column 3 is insignificant.g1
Within the network, evidence on risk sharing (though not complete risk
sharing) has been found for many countries (see, e.g., Jalan and Ravallion
16 One may argue that transfers should have two components: the expected transfers (tr1) and the
unexpected transfers (tr2); tr1 might respond to tr2. This makes it desirable to regress tr1 on the
sum of tr2 and the shocks derived in this article. Unfortunately the data do not allow breaking
the transfers into tr1 and tr2. However, suppose this were feasible, then the estimates I report in
this article should be an overestimate of the true impact of transfer on risk pooling (attenuation
bias). This reinforces my conclusion that the impact of transfers on risk pooling is very small.
17 Regressing taxes and contributions to peasant associations on the independent variables in table
6 (results not shown), I find that these taxes and contributions contribute to income redistribution.
This is the main reason that transfers from government/NGOs are found to play a role in
redistribution.
18 As mentioned in Section II, extreme values of transfers are observed for some of the households.
These observations may change the results of the estimation. To detect outliers, I use two criteria:
(1) studentized residuals, Cook’s distance, leverage, DFITS or DFBETA of , ,cov idis s E y vht vht t1 vht
exceed their cutoffs; (2) household income is in the highest or lowest percentiles, or livestockE yt1 vt
the household owns is in the highest percentile, or land the household owns is in the highest
percentile, or total transfers of the household is in the highest or lowest percentiles. If both criteria
are satisfied, the observation is considered to be an outlier and is deleted from the analysis. In total
91 out of 4,164 observations are dropped. Including the outliers in the sample, I found that all
the estimates of , and are not significant at the 10% level. Only for transfers fromg g v g1 2 1
government/NGOs is significant at the 15% level.
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1999 for China; Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997 for India; and De Weerdt and
Dercon 2006 for Tanzania). However, in these studies, the contributions of
transfers on risk sharing cannot be distinguished from the contributions of
other risk-sharing institutions. Morduch (1999) suggests that transfers from
mutual support only play a minor role in risk sharing, especially where mi-
gration is limited. The risk sharing of idiosyncratic shocks through mutual
support is indeed found to be insignificant in the 15 Ethiopian villages in
table 6.
The results show that transfers from government/NGOs insure covariant
shocks (the coefficient is significantly negative in col. 2), and idiosyncraticg1
shocks are not significantly insured by transfers from government and NGOs
( in col. 2 is not significant at the 10% level in table 6). Different fromg2
transfers from mutual support, transfers from government/NGOs have the
ability to help the households pool covariant shocks. As just mentioned, house-
holds are not able to pool covariant shocks by relying on their social networks.
Thus it is even more necessary for the government and NGOs to insure common
shocks like drought, flood, and so on. Transfers from government and NGOs
that target the covariant shocks can always play a role as a useful safety net
to guarantee the effectiveness of the risk-sharing arrangement, as the system
of informal risk-sharing arrangement is more likely to be down when income
is in general low (Coate and Ravallion 1993). There can be two reasons that
idiosyncratic shocks are not insured by transfers from government/NGOs. First,
insuring idiosyncratic shocks is difficult and costly, since idiosyncratic shocks
are much more challenging to be detected by external agencies. Second, in
the communities where well-functioning risk-sharing arrangements exist,
households can fully insure their idiosyncratic income shocks by pooling risk
with their friends and relatives. In such communities, it may not be necessary
for the government and NGOs to target the idiosyncratic shocks. However,
the second reason does not seem to reflect the situation in table 6, as transfers
from friends/relatives are not found to be able to insure the idiosyncratic shocks.
B. Results on Transfers Received
The results shown in the previous section are for regressions on net transfers.
However, some of the components of the outflows of transfers (e.g., the taxes
and contributions to peasant associations) may not be intended for risk pooling.
Additionally, the data only provide information on limited categories of out-
flows of transfers (e.g., taxes and contributions to peasant associations, edu-
cational and medical expenses households pay for members of other households,
contributions to church and iddir, and contributions for livestock loss), and
therefore the measures of the outflows of transfers may be incomplete. There-
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TABLE 7
RESULTS ON TRANSFERS RECEIVED
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables
Transfers Received
from Government/NGOs
(1)
Income from
Food-for-Work Programs
(2)
Transfers Received
from Mutual Support
(3)
covs (g )vht 1 .0015***
(3.16)
.0031***
(3.06)
.0010
(.93)
idis (g )vht 2 .0001
(.48)
.0005*
(1.76)
.000001
(.00)
E y E y (v)t1 vht t1 vt .0004
(.89)
.0002
(.58)
.0003
(.39)
Landless 2.094
(1.52)
2.689*
(1.89)
2.377
(1.14)
Land quality 2.277*
(1.64)
1.425
(1.20)
3.367**
(2.06)
Plant coffee 2.879
(1.64)
.662
(.55)
.328
(.11)
Plant qat .513
(.41)
.638
(.24)
1.246
(.35)
Plant false banana 1.798
(1.32)
.075
(.09)
6.992*
(1.76)
Plant eucalyptus .611
(.67)
.232
(.14)
2.639*
(1.73)
Female head 1.816
(1.52)
2.206
(1.33)
3.592*
(1.95)
Head age .069**
(2.54)
.036
(1.17)
.098**
(2.14)
Head education .332***
(2.63)
.075
(.54)
.203
(.81)
Constant 3.581**
(1.98)
.767
(.43)
1.842
(.67)
Village dummies Not reported
Observations 4,080 4,080 4,080
2R .24 .14 .05
Note. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
fore, I further study the effect of the inflows of the transfers on risk pooling.
I redo the regressions shown in table 6 but instead of net transfers I put the
measures of transfers received on the left-hand side. Considering that there
may be differences between income from food-for-work programs and other
transfers received from government/NGOs, I do the regressions for them sep-
arately. The results are shown in table 7. The three columns show the results
for transfers received from government/NGOs (excluding income from food-
for-work programs), income from food-for-work programs, and transfers re-
ceived from mutual support, respectively.
In terms of insurance, the transfers received from government/NGOs and
Pan 829
income from food-for-work programs play a role in insuring covariant shocks
( is equal to0.0015 with a t-value of3.16 in col. 1 and equal to0.0031g1
with a t-value of 3.06 in col. 2). Transfers received from mutual support do
not contribute to insuring income shocks, as both and are highly insig-g g1 2
nificant in column 3. These findings are consistent with the results in table 6.
In column 2, is significantly positive (the value is very close to zerog2
though). This means that households with negative idiosyncratic income shocks
receive less from food-for-work programs. One explanation is that, when there
are food-for-work programs set up at a location suffering from covariant shocks,
households suffering higher idiosyncratic shocks face more constraints to join
the programs. For example, if one or more members of a household are having
health problems, the household may find that it does not have extra labor to
join the programs. There is no evidence in table 7 that transfers received
contribute to income redistribution.
C. Results on Consumption
The measured shocks described in this article can be easily used to study how
much risk is insured in total. Transfers play only a small role in risk pooling
in these 15 Ethiopian villages. If getting transfers is the only strategy house-
holds use to stabilize their consumption, their consumption should move
almost perfectly along with the shocks. However, this is not the case. I redo
the regression shown in equation (14) but put household yearly consumption
on the left-hand side instead. The results are shown in table 8. Consumption
does move along with shocks since both and are positive. However, bothg g1 2
coefficients significantly differ from 1. The coefficient of the covariant shock
is equal to 0.500, which means that households can only insure about half of
the covariant shocks. The idiosyncratic shocks are, however, well insured. Only
9% of the idiosyncratic shocks leads to variation in consumption.
V. Conclusion
This article studies the role of transfers in risk pooling and income redistri-
bution in Ethiopia. It explores not just whether but how much risk pooling is
achieved through transfers for households in ERHS villages using a regression
based concept of income shocks. From a regression of net transfers on income
shocks, the covariant shocks are found to be partially insured by transfers from
government/NGOs. However, the impact is very limited. Transfers from mu-
tual support do not play a role in risk pooling. There is also evidence that
transfers play a role in redistributing income from richer to poorer households.
The results indicate that the aid provided through food aid and food-for-
work programs does not generate much help to the ones who actually need
830 economic development and cultural change
TABLE 8
RESULTS ON CONSUMPTION
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Consumption
covs (g )vht 1 .500***
(4.71)
idis (g )vht 2 .090**
(2.38)
E y E y (v)t1 vht t1 vt 1.270***
(13.13)
Landless 69.530
(.37)
Land quality 250.915
(1.55)
Plant coffee 412.424*
(1.70)
Plant qat 583.790*
(1.84)
Plant false banana 389.133
(1.47)
Plant eucalyptus 73.405
(.46)
Female head 481.474***
(3.36)
Head age 3.998
(1.12)
Head education 31.300
(1.05)
Constant 6,010.490***
(19.48)
Village dummies Not reported
Observations 4,038
2R .24
Note. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard
errors.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
it. Only the covariant shocks faced by the households are found to be insured
by these transfers at a very low level. Both transfers received from food-for-
work programs and other transfers from government/NGOs do not seem to
have a significant impact on income redistribution.
The results also provide insights in the scope for introducing formal in-
surance to insure shocks. Results here have shown that transfers from informal
social networks do not play a role in risk pooling. Even if “crowding out”
does happen when formal insurance is implemented, it will have only a very
minor impact on risk pooling.
Since the results on consumption show that households insure part of the
covariant shocks and most of the idiosyncratic shocks, though transfers play
only a small role in insurance, savings may serve an important role in stabilizing
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consumption in these 15 Ethiopian villages. Therefore, the impact of savings
on risk pooling is an essential question and needs further research.19 Though
most of the research on risk pooling strategies studies the impact of different
strategies separately, one should notice that the impact of transfers on risk
pooling is not isolated from the impact of other strategies (e.g., savings) in
reality. However, evaluating the impact of the strategies jointly cannot be
achieved by estimating reduced-form regressions. Further research of evaluating
the impact of transfers and savings jointly by employing more sophisticated
models will be very helpful in more deeply understanding the behavior of the
households.
Appendix A
Estimation of the Income Function
I use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to estimate the income function
defined in Section III.A.
r r r t/ry p (a k  a lab  a lan )vht 1 vht1 2 vht1 3 vht1
# exp h a  f c  w l  l w(   i i,vht1 j j,vh t t p p,vht
i j t p
 x o  cons e ,) q q,vht vht
q
lab p m  b f  b ch ,vht1 vht1 1 vht1 2 vht1
e p g  b  n ,vht vt vh vht
g 2 2 n 2 2Cov (e , e )p c j  j  c j p j ,vh,94 vh,95 1 g b 1 n 1
g 2 2 n 2 2Cov (e , e )p c j  j  c j p j ,vh,95 vh,97 2 g b 2 n 2
g 2 2 n 2 2Cov (e , e )p c j  j  c j p j ,vh,94 vh,97 3 g b 3 n 3
19 It should be noted from table 8 that consumption is sensitive to income shocks especially to
covariant income shocks, so savings are not sufficient in stabilizing consumption in these 15
Ethiopian villages.
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which can be written as:
t
r r rlog (y )p  log (a k  a lab  a lan )( )vht 1 vht1 2 vht1 3 vht1
r
 h a  f c  w l  l w   i i,vht1 j j,vh t t p p,vht
i j t p
 x o  cons e , q q,vht vht
q
lab p m  b f  b ch .vht1 vht1 1 vht1 2 vht1
It is obvious that the parameters of this function will not be estimated
efficiently and the estimators of the covariance matrix will not be valid if it
is estimated by nonlinear least squares (NLS) because the error terms are
correlated through and are also serially correlated. I use FGLS to estimategvt
this function. The generalized least-squares estimator of this function is
T 1ˆ ˆ(log (y) log (y)) Q (log (y) log (y)),
where is the fitted value of and is the variance-covarianceˆlog (y) log (y) Q
matrix of the error term.
The essential part of the estimation is to obtain an estimate of . If twoQ
observations are from different villages their error terms are not correlated. If
two observations are from the same year and village, the error terms are
correlated through . The error terms are also serially correlated.gvt
To get estimates of the covariance matrix, estimates of the variances of the
three components of the shocks are needed. I do this by first estimating the
function using NLS so I can get estimates of (denoted by ). After doingˆe evht vht
an NLS estimation, I perform the following steps:
1. Run a regression of on the village-year dummies. The fitted valueseˆvht
from this regression are taken as the estimates of ( ) and the residualsˆg gvt vt
are taken as the estimates of ( ).ˆ ˆb  n b  nvh vht vh vht
2. Calculate the variances of and to get and and2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆg b  n j j  jvt vh vht g b n
plug these variances into the covariance matrix .Q
3. Calculate the covariance of and as an estimate of and get and2 2ˆ ˆe e j j94 95 1 2
in the same way. Plug the variances into the covariance matrix .2jˆ Q3
4. Do the FGLS estimation by using the estimate of .Q
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TABLE B1
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSIONS USING TABLE 3
Variables
Median
Income Constant Observations 2R
Government/NGOs:
Transfers in, value .639
(1.06)
2,239.06*
(1.76)
45 .03
Transfers in, percentage .00005
(-1.65)
.175***
(3.02)
45 .06
Food for work, value .338*
(-1.83)
1,247.51***
(3.20)
45 .07
Food for work, percentage .00005*
(-1.91)
.165***
(3.18)
45 .08
Transfers out, value .420
(1.65)
555.53
(1.03)
45 .06
Transfers out, percentage .00003
(.64)
.421***
(4.80)
45 .01
Friends/relatives:
Transfers in, value .552**
(2.03)
477.81
(.83)
45 .09
Transfers in, percentage .000005
(.22)
.099**
(2.21)
45 .01
Transfers out, value .656**
(3.51)
520.30
(1.32)
45 .22
Transfers out, percentage .00014**
(4.48)
.467**
(7.13)
45 .32
Note. The t-statistics are in the parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
TABLE B2
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ON CROP STORAGE
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable: Uvht
Coefficient t-Statistic
a(cr  cr )/0.5(cr  cr )1vh97 vh94 vh97 vh94 .043*** 3.28
Constant .136*** 6.69
Observations 1,461
2R .007
Note. The variable Uvht is defined in eq. (11).
a The variables crvh94 and crvh97 are the crops the household stored in the first and
the fourth round, respectively. Dividing by the mean of crvh94 and crvh97 makes the
expression unit free, and adding 1 makes it possible to include the observations
with no crop stored in both the first and the fourth rounds.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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